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The Aboriginal Constitution
Brian Slattery*

I. INTRODUCTION
In a remarkable series of cases over the past decade, from Haida
Nation1 to Manitoba Metis2 the Supreme Court of Canada has
highlighted three basic elements of Aboriginal law: the honour of the
Crown, the Royal Proclamation, 1763,3 and Aboriginal Treaties. In this
paper, I argue that these form the framework of the Aboriginal
Constitution, which parallels the federal pact between the provinces in
the Constitution Act, 18674 and provides the Constitution of Canada with
its most ancient and enduring roots.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Manitoba Metis5 makes a
significant contribution to the subject. The Court holds that the honour of
the Crown was breached by its failure to implement diligently the
constitutional obligations undertaken toward the Métis people in
section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870,6 in which the Crown promised to
distribute 1.4 million acres of land to the children of Métis families in
Manitoba when it entered Confederation.
The decision stands for several basic points. Chief Justice McLachlin
and Karakatsanis J. hold for a strong majority7 that the principle of the
*
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. I am grateful for the
valuable comments of my research assistant, John Wilson, and two anonymous reviewers.
1
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3
S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”].
2
Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14,
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C) [hereinafter “Manitoba Metis”].
3
Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1 [hereinafter “Royal Proclamation”]. A more
accurate text of the Proclamation is found in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations
Relating to America (Worcester, MA: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), at 212. The original
handwritten text, entered on the Patent Roll for the regnal year 4 Geo. III, is located in the United
Kingdom Public Record Office: c. 66/3693 (back of roll).
4
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5].
5
Supra, note 2.
6
S.C. 1870, c. 3 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 8).
7
The majority comprised six members of an eight-judge panel: McLachlin C.J.C. and
LeBel, Fish, Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ., with Rothstein and Moldaver JJ. dissenting.
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honour of the Crown extends to all explicit constitutional obligations
undertaken by the Crown to Aboriginal peoples and generates a duty of
diligent, purposive fulfilment.8 This duty has two aspects: first, the
Crown must take a broad purposive approach to the interpretation of its
constitutional obligations; and second, it must act diligently to fulfil
them.9 The courts have the power to determine whether the Crown has
met this standard and to issue appropriate declarations to enforce it. A
claim that the Crown has violated its constitutional obligations cannot be
time-barred. Neither statutes of limitations nor the common law doctrine
of laches can prevent courts from issuing declarations on the
constitutionality of the Crown’s conduct in this context.10
The ruling is of historic significance in its own right, as official
recognition of long-standing Métis grievances over the way in which
section 31 was implemented. However, the broader principles endorsed
by the Court lend it added weight, making it one of the most meaningful
Aboriginal rulings to be handed down in recent times.
In this paper, I offer some thoughts on the decision’s import for the
Aboriginal Constitution, focusing on the three cornerstones identified at
the start: the honour of the Crown, the Royal Proclamation and
Aboriginal Treaties. I close with a discussion of the Crown’s duties of
diligent performance and negotiation.

II. THE HONOUR OF THE CROWN
The Crown and its servants must conduct themselves with honour in
their dealings with Aboriginal peoples.11 This principle is a grounding
postulate of Canadian constitutional law — a “core precept” that gives
rise to an array of substantive obligations.12 The principle lies at the base
8

Manitoba Metis, supra, note 2, at paras. 68-83 and 91-94.
Id., at para. 75.
10
Id., at paras. 133-153.
11
Id., at para. 65.
12
Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at paras. 16 and 18; Manitoba Metis, supra, note 2, at para. 73;
Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] S.C.J. No. 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103, at para. 42
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Beckman”]. For discussion of the principle, see David Arnot, “The Honour of
First Nations — the Honour of the Crown: The Unique Relationship of First Nations with the
Crown” in Jennifer Smith & Michael Jackson, eds., The Evolving Canadian Crown (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012) 155; Jamie Dickson, “The Honour of the Crown: Making
Sense of Crown Liability Doctrine in Crown/Aboriginal Law in Canada”, LL.M. Thesis, College of
Law, University of Saskatchewan, 2014; Sébastien Grammond, Terms of Coexistence: Indigenous
Peoples and Canadian Law, trans. Jodi Lazare (Toronto: Carswell, 2013), at 132-35, 265; James
9
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of the Canadian constitutional order and governs the actions of the
Crown from the initial assertion of sovereignty onward.13 Although the
honour of the Crown has been incorporated into a number of
constitutional documents, in essence it is a matter of common law.14
In Manitoba Metis, the Court traces the doctrine to the early periods
of European exploration and settlement, when the British Crown
launched claims to vast tracts of North America that were actually
subject to pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty and territorial rights.15 The
tension between these conflicting claims gave rise to a special
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, which required

(Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2007), at 25-26, 92-96, 829-31, 887-944; Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties:
Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2012);
Peter Hogg & Laura Dougan, “The Honour of the Crown: Reshaping Canada’s Constitutional Law”,
paper prepared for the conference “Treaty Implementation: Honouring the Duty to Implement in
Good Faith” hosted by the Pacific Business & Law Institute, June 17 & 18, 2014, Vancouver, B.C.
[hereinafter “Hogg & Dougan”]; Timothy Huyer, “Honour of the Crown: The New Approach to
Crown-Aboriginal Reconciliation” (March 2006) 21 W.R.L.S.I. 33; Kent McNeil, “The Crown’s
Fiduciary Obligations in the Era of Aboriginal Self-Government” (2009) 88 Can. Bar Rev. 1;
Dwight Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples, rev. ed. (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing, 2014), at 23-35; Guy Régimbald & Dwight Newman, The Law of the Canadian
Constitution (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2013), at 804-10; Timothy McCabe, The Honour
of the Crown and its Fiduciary Duties to Aboriginal Peoples (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada,
2008); Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d)
433 [hereinafter “Slattery, ‘Aboriginal Rights’”]; Brian Slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution:
A Question of Trust” (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261 [hereinafter “Slattery, ‘First Nations and the
Constitution’”]; Mark Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada”
[hereinafter “Walters, ‘The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation’”] in Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir,
eds., The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008) 165.
13
See Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 17: “In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples,
from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the
Crown must act honourably.” See also, id., at para. 32.
14
Justice Rothstein points this out in his dissent in Manitoba Metis, supra, note 2, at para. 156;
see also paras. 204, 205, 212, and 267. For fuller consideration, see Hogg & Dougan, supra, note 12,
at 4-8; Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights”, supra, note 12, at 443-45.
15
Manitoba Metis, supra, note 2, at paras. 66-67, quoting Taku River Tlingit First Nation v.
British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, at para. 24
(S.C.C.), and Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 32. See also Haida Nation, id., at para. 20,
where the Court says: “Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed
Crown sovereignty …”. For a review of early European claims, see Brian Slattery, “Paper Empires:
The Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America” in John McLaren, A.R.
Buck & Nancy Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 50; Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples
(Doctoral Dissertation, Oxford University, 1979), at 66-125, online: <http://works.bepress.com/
brian_slattery/24> [hereinafter “Slattery, Land Rights”].
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the Crown to deal honourably with them.16 The doctrine found
expression in the Royal Proclamation, which refers to “the several
Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and who live
under our Protection”. The Court notes that the “Protection” proffered by
the Crown did not arise from a paternalistic desire to protect Indigenous
Nations; rather, it was a recognition of their military strength and the
need to persuade them that their rights would be better protected by
peaceful relations than force of arms.
The ultimate purpose of the honour of the Crown, says the Court, is
the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal societies with the assertion
of Crown sovereignty. The doctrine has been enshrined in section 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982,17 which recognizes and affirms existing
Aboriginal rights and envisages the negotiation of just settlements of
Aboriginal claims. In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the Crown
must act honourably, in accordance with its historical and future
relationship with Aboriginal peoples.
This account prompts several fundamental questions. How precisely
does the honour of the Crown stem from the tension between Crown
claims and pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty? What role is played by
the Royal Proclamation, and how do the Treaties with Aboriginal peoples
figure in the process? More broadly, what does the notion of “honour”
actually require, and what sort of “reconciliation” does the Court
envisage?
These are difficult questions, which do not allow for simple answers.
Nevertheless, some markers are provided by the Royal Proclamation and
its historical context.

III. THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION, 1763
The Royal Proclamation was drafted to deal with the aftermath of the
Seven Years’ War and the cession of New France to Great Britain in
1763.18 It is a patchwork of a document, which cobbles together topics as
Quoting Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights”, supra, note 12, at 436.
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Section 35(1) provides: “The existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”
18
For detailed legal analysis of the Royal Proclamation, see Slattery, Land Rights, supra,
note 15, at 191-361. For a brief account, see Brian Slattery, “The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal
Rights in Canada” (1984) 32 Am. J. Comp. Law 361, at 368-72. For Aboriginal perspectives on the
Royal Proclamation, see the thoughtful discussion in John Borrows, “Constitutional Law from a
First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal Proclamation” (1994) 28 U.B.C. L. Rev. 1
16
17
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diverse as the boundaries of new British colonies and land grants to
disbanded soldiers. The final Part of the Royal Proclamation contains
detailed measures concerning Indigenous peoples and their lands —
measures of profound constitutional importance.
The provisions reflect several factors. From early times, the British
Crown cultivated relationships with powerful Aboriginal nations living in
the territories adjacent to the British settlements on the Atlantic seaboard
— the Micmac, the Iroquois Confederacy, the Cherokee, and many
others.19 These relations took many forms — from Treaties of peace and
friendship to seasonal parleys, from military alliances to trading
partnerships, from land cessions to mutual guarantees of rights. Over
time, these exchanges gave rise to a diffuse body of customary law and
practice that was neither wholly Indigenous nor European but a form of
intersocietal law that bridged the gulf between Aboriginal and English
legal systems. This body of customary law provides the foundation for
the Royal Proclamation and remedies some of its gaps and ambiguities.20
The second major factor influencing the Royal Proclamation was the
French Crown’s departure from the imperial field of contest, leaving
behind an extensive network of Indigenous allies and trading partners
stretching westward into the heart of the continent.21 The character of
French-Indigenous relations was described in the landmark case of
Connolly v. Woolrich, decided by Monk J. in 1867:
[The French] entered into treaties with the Indian tribes and nations,
and carried on a lucrative and extensive fur trade with the natives.

[hereinafter “Borrows, ‘Constitutional Law’”], and John Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal
Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government” [hereinafter “Borrows, ‘Wampum at
Niagara’”] in Michael Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality,
and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 155. For the broader historical context,
see Colin G. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) [hereinafter “Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen”];
Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region,
1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Lawrence Gipson, The Triumphant Empire:
New Responsibilities within the Enlarged Empire, 1763-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968).
19
See, e.g., Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain
Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of
1744 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984).
20
For a fuller account, see Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006)
85 Can. Bar Rev. 255; Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727,
especially at 745-46.
21
See, e.g., Gilles Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy
in the Seventeenth Century, trans. Phyllis Aronoff & Howard Scott (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2001).
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Neither the French Government, nor any of its colonists or their trading
associations, ever attempted, during an intercourse of over two hundred
years, to subvert or modify the laws and usages of the aboriginal tribes,
except where they had established colonies and permanent settlements,
and, then only by persuasion …22

Many of these Indigenous nations had little love for the British Crown
and were deeply suspicious of its overall intentions. As the Chippewa
leader, Minivavana, told an English trader:
Englishman, although you have conquered the French, you have not yet
conquered us. We are not your slaves. These lakes, these woods and
mountains, were left to us by our ancestors. They are our inheritance;
and we will part with them to none. 23

Similar views were expressed by some Wabash River Indians:
[Y]ou tell us, that when you Conquered the French, they gave you this
Country. That no difference may happen hereafter, we tell you now the
French never conquered, neither did they purchase a foot of our
Country, nor have [they a right] to give it to you, we gave them liberty
to settle for which they always rewarded us and treated us with great
Civility.24

Aboriginal discontent came to a boiling point in the spring of 1763.
War belts circulated from village to village, and the Ottawa war chief,
Pontiac, gave voice to the underlying anger:
It is important for us, my brothers, that we exterminate from our lands
this nation which seeks only to destroy us. You see as well as I that we
can no longer supply our needs, as we have done, from our brothers,
the French.25

In May, a coalition of Aboriginal nations launched the armed conflict
known as Pontiac’s War, which quickly spread across an enormous
territory from the Great Lakes south to the Ohio Valley. One after
another, British forts in the western interior fell to Indigenous forces,
leaving only Fort Pitt, Detroit and Niagara. Five hundred British soldiers

22

[1867] C.C.S. No. 32, 17 R.J.R.Q. 75, at 82 (Que. S.C.).
Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Territories between
the Years 1760 and 1776 (1809), at 44; quoted in Dorothy Jones, License for Empire: Colonialism
by Treaty in Early America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), at 71.
24
George Croghan, “Journals”, Illinois Historical Collections, Vol. 11, at 47-48; quoted in
Jones, License for Empire, id., at 73. The statement was made in 1765, but it reflects earlier attitudes.
25
Quoted in Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen, supra, note 18, at 70.
23

(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE ABORIGINAL CONSTITUTION

325

and numerous settlers lost their lives in the conflagration, and Detroit
itself was under siege for six months.26
Even before the outbreak of war, the British government had been
formulating a plan to assure Indigenous nations of the Crown’s good
intentions. This appears from a letter written in January 1763 by Lord
Egremont27 to the Commander in Chief in North America, Sir Jeffrey
Amherst. Egremont refers to the threat of an Indian war erupting over
settlements made on Indian lands near the Susquehannah River and states
that the King had it “much at heart to conciliate the Affection of the
Indian Nations, by every Act of strict Justice, and by affording them His
Royal Protection from any Incroachment on the Lands they have
reserved to themselves, for their hunting Grounds, & for their own
Support & Habitation”.28
In March 1763, Egremont followed this up with a circular letter to
the Governors of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia,
as well as the Superintendent for Southern Indians. He notes that the
departure of the French and the Spaniards will “undoubtedly alarm, &
increase the Jealousy of the Neighbouring Indians”. He speaks of the
need to gain their confidence and goodwill, and to dispel the false notion
that “the English entertain a settled Design of extirpating the whole
Indian Race, with a View to possess & enjoy their Lands”. Egremont
orders the officials to call a joint meeting with the chiefs of all the major
southern tribes, so as to reassure them of Britain’s good intentions and to
promise “a continual Attention to their Interests, & … a Readiness upon
all Occasions to do them Justice”.29
News travelled slowly in that era, and it was only in July that the
first reports of Pontiac’s War reached England. The news confirmed
the British government’s fears and gave greater urgency to the plans
already underway, resulting in the issue of the Royal Proclamation on
October 7, 1763.30

26

Id., at 66-91.
Lord Egremont was the British Secretary of State for the Southern Department.
28
“Fitch Papers”, Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society (Hartford, CT:
Connecticut Historical Society, 1860-1967), Vol. XVIII, at 224; quoted in Slattery, Land Rights,
supra, note 15, at 192.
29
William Saunders, ed., The Colonial Records of North Carolina (Raleigh, NC: P.M.
Hale, 1886-90), Vol. VI, at 974-76; quoted in Slattery, Land Rights, id., at 192-93.
30
For a detailed account of the Royal Proclamation’s drafting, see Slattery, Land Rights,
id., at 191-203.
27
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The Indian provisions of the Royal Proclamation are introduced by a
preamble that sets out the overall vision of the Crown:
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and
the Security of Our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of
Indians, with whom We are connected, and who live under Our
Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of
such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded
to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their
Hunting Grounds. …

This preamble has several striking features. First, the Crown
acknowledges that the Royal Proclamation is prompted not simply by
considerations of justice but also by military necessity. Unless the British
are able to maintain peaceful relations with neighbouring Indian nations,
the security of the American colonies would be at risk. Peace is
“essential” to British interests.
Second, the Crown asserts ultimate sovereignty over extensive
regions in the American interior, styling them “Our Dominions and
Territories”. But the Crown also recognizes that these territories
are actually in the possession of numerous Indian nations, which
are “connected” with the Crown and live under British “Protection”.
The connections to which the text alludes presumably consisted of the
long-standing ties of treaty, alliance and trade between Indigenous
nations and English colonies, and the similar network of links that the
Crown had hopefully inherited from the French — now in a state of
shambles due to the war.
Third, the Crown tacitly acknowledges the autonomy of the “Nations
or Tribes of Indians”, as distinct political entities with their own political
structures and laws. It recognizes their rights to the territories in their
possession and undertakes to prevent them from being molested or
disturbed. The Royal Proclamation goes on to lay down strict limits on
land grants and settlements in Indian territories. It outlaws the private
purchase of Indian lands and puts in place a regime requiring the public
cession of such lands to the Crown — a regime reflecting established law
and practice in many colonies.31 The Crown confirms that Aboriginal
peoples have rights not only to their village sites and cultivated fields but
also to the “Hunting Grounds” from which they draw their sustenance
and support — in Lord Egremont’s phrase “the Lands they have reserved
31

See Slattery, Land Rights, id., at 112-25.
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to themselves, for their hunting Grounds, & for their own Support &
Habitation”.
Overall, then, the Royal Proclamation contemplates a quasi-federal
structure in which a protective shield of imperial rule is extended over a
host of autonomous Indian nations, living within their own territories,
with their own internal governments and laws. These nations are not
conquered peoples nor are they subject to direct British rule — rather
their connections with the Crown take the form of Treaties periodically
negotiated and renewed, often in annual sessions. The Treaties form the
main supporting columns and beams of the structure, which otherwise
might collapse like a house of cards, as Pontiac’s War demonstrated.
Of course the Royal Proclamation reflects an expansionist imperial
perspective, one more optimistic than the facts warranted. A better
understanding of the situation may be gleaned from the Treaty of
Niagara, concluded the following year, in the summer of 1764.32 The
Treaty was negotiated in an immense gathering of Indigenous peoples —
the largest ever seen in the northeast to that date — including
representatives of nations as far west as the Mississippi, as far north as
Hudson Bay, and perhaps even east to Nova Scotia.33 There were some
2,000 chiefs in attendance and over 24 Aboriginal nations represented. In
the course of the negotiations, the British representative, Sir William
Johnson, presented the great belt of the Covenant Chain, stating:
Brothers of the Western Nations, Sachims, Chiefs and Warriors;
You have now been here for several days, during which time we have
frequently met to renew and Strengthen our Engagements and you have
made so many Promises of your Friendship and Attachment to the
English that there now only remains for us to exchange the great Belt of
the Covenant Chain that we may not forget our mutual Engagements.
I now therefore present you the great Belt by which I bind all your
Western Nations together with the English, and I desire that you will
take fast hold of the same, and never let it slip, to which end I desire
that after you have shewn this Belt to all Nations you will fix one end
of it with the Chipeweighs at St. Mary’s whilst the other end remains at

32
See the pioneering work of Paul Williams, The Chain (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University, 1982), at 72-94 [hereinafter “Williams”], and the detailed discussion
in Borrows, “Constitutional Law”, supra, note 18, and Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara”, supra,
note 18.
33
Williams, id., at 79; Borrows, “Constitutional Law”, id., at 22.
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my house, and moreover I desire that you will never listen to any news
which comes to any other Quarter. If you do it, it may shake the Belt.
I exhort you then to preserve my words in your Hearts, to look upon
this Belt as the Chain that binds you to the English, and never to let it
slip out of your hands.
Gave the Great Covenant Chain, 23 rows broad and the year 1764
worked upon it, worth about 30 pounds.34

The spirit of equality and fair dealing that informs this Treaty is quite
palpable. Indeed in a subsequent letter, Sir William Johnson expressly
quashes any notion that the Treaty involved the subjection of the
Aboriginal nations concerned.35
We need to draw a basic distinction, then, between the constitutional
structure envisaged in the Royal Proclamation and its application to
particular Aboriginal nations. From the perspective of the British Crown,
the Royal Proclamation constituted a constitutional template designed to
govern and regularize its relations with Indigenous nations — not only
for the present but also for the future.36 However, the application of the
template to specific nations depended on two factors: whether those
nations had entered into Treaties that acknowledged or consented to the
Crown’s protective role; or whether, in the absence of such consent, they
had factually come under British rule. In other words, the constitutional
structure envisaged in the Royal Proclamation, might come into effect
either de jure, through Treaties, or de facto, through the actual imposition
of British governmental authority.
As the Crown’s power and influence grew over the next century and
the tide of British rule spread steadily westward, the Royal Proclamation
became a kind of Magna Carta that applied presumptively to Aboriginal
peoples falling under the Crown’s sway, whether by way of treaty or
through factual processes.37 When the Crown entered into relations with
new Aboriginal nations and assumed governmental responsibility for

34

Quoted in Williams, id., at 82-83.
Id., at 83, and Borrows “Constitutional Law”, supra, note 18, at 24-25.
36
The legal arguments for the continuing application of the Royal Proclamation are
considered in Slattery, Land Rights, supra, note 15, at 329-49.
37
See Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R.
313, at 395 (S.C.C), where Hall J. stated: “[The Royal Proclamation’s] force as a statute is
analogous to the status of Magna Carta which has always been considered to be the law throughout
the Empire. It was a law which followed the flag as England assumed jurisdiction over newlydiscovered or acquired lands or territories.”
35
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them, it did so against a backdrop of fundamental constitutional norms
flowing from the Royal Proclamation and the body of intersocietal law
that it reflected.
What does the Supreme Court have to say about this complex sweep
of historical events, and the contrasting roles played by Treaties and
power politics? And, how does all this relate to the honour of the Crown?

IV. TREATIES AND THE NEGOTIATED CONSTITUTION
In Manitoba Metis, the Supreme Court stresses the contractual and
consensual nature of the process that gave rise to the Confederation of
Canada.38 The Court notes that Canada is a young nation with ancient
roots. The country was born in 1867 with the “consensual union” of three
colonies — United Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Soon
after, the Canadian government embarked on a policy to bring the
territories west of Ontario within the boundaries of Canada and to open
them up to settlement. This meant dealing with the Indigenous peoples
living there, which consisted mainly of two groups — the First Nations
and the Métis.
The Court recounts that the government’s policy regarding the First
Nations was “to enter into treaties with the various bands, whereby they
agreed to settlement of their lands in exchange for reservations of land
and other promises”.39 The policy with respect to the Métis population
was less clear. Settlers began pouring into the region that is now
Manitoba, displacing Métis social and political control and leading to
resistance and conflict. To resolve the conflict and assure peaceful
annexation of the territory, the Canadian government entered into
negotiations with representatives of the Métis-led provisional
government of the territory. The result was the Manitoba Act, 1870,
which made Manitoba a province of Canada.
In a significant passage, the Court states that the promises made in
this Act “represent the terms under which the Métis people agreed to
surrender their claims to govern themselves and their territory, and
become part of the new nation of Canada”.40 In essence, the case
involves “a collective claim of the Métis people, based on a promise

38
39
40

Supra, note 2; the following account is drawn from paras. 1-5.
Id., at para. 3.
Id., at para. 5.
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made to them in return for their agreement to recognize Canada’s
sovereignty over them”.41
In effect, the Court’s account draws parallels between the process
whereby the provinces entered the federal union, and that whereby
Aboriginal peoples became partners in Confederation. In both cases, the
Crown usually proceeded by way of negotiation and agreement, a route
not without its difficulties and conflicts. In both cases, it made solemn
promises in order to secure the other party’s agreement to enter Canada.
In both cases, the resulting pact was embodied in fundamental
constitutional accords — termed “Constitution Acts” in the case of the
provinces,42 “Treaties” in the case of First Nations.43
As the Supreme Court says in Haida Nation, Treaties serve to
reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown
sovereignty.44 It goes on to explain:
Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans
came, and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims
with the sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others,
notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The potential rights
embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined,
recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. …45

In these passages, the Court highlights the need for Aboriginal
consent — not simply as a matter of justice, but as a matter of
constitutional duty, impelled by the honour of the Crown. Reconciliation
cannot be achieved by governmental or judicial fiat, but only through
genuine negotiations leading to Treaties. In the process, the prior
sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples is reconciled with Crown claims of

41

Id., at para. 44.
This, of course, is the modern terminology laid down in the Schedule to the Constitution
Act, 1982, replacing the old “British North America Acts”.
43
See the interesting remarks of Deschamps J. in Beckman, supra, note 12, at para. 97,
where she suggests that three basic compacts underpin the Canadian Constitution: “(1) one between
the Crown and individuals with respect to the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms; (2) one
between the non-Aboriginal population and Aboriginal peoples with respect to Aboriginal rights and
treaties with Aboriginal peoples; and (3) a ‘federal compact’ between the provinces.” For a parallel
view, see Slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution”, supra, note 12, at 268-76.
44
Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 20.
45
Id., at para. 25.
42
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sovereignty. The result is something new — arguably a form of shared
sovereignty.46
The fundamental kinship between Treaties and Constitution Acts is
emphasized in Manitoba Metis, where the Court discusses section 31 of
the Manitoba Act, 1870. The passage merits reproduction at length.
To understand the nature of s. 31 as a solemn obligation, it may be
helpful to consider its treaty-like history and character. Section 31 sets
out solemn promises — promises which are no less fundamental than
treaty promises. Section 31, like a treaty, was adopted with “the
intention to create obligations ... and a certain measure of solemnity”
… It was intended to create legal obligations of the highest order: no
greater solemnity than inclusion in the Constitution of Canada can be
conceived. Section 31 was conceived in the context of negotiations to
create the new province of Manitoba. And all this was done to the end
of reconciling the Métis Aboriginal interest with the Crown’s claim to
sovereignty.47

In essence, then, the Supreme Court presents the vision of a
negotiated Constitution — a federal union knit together with the consent
of the peoples affected, both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal. In the past,
this process took place in a wide variety of contexts — ranging from the
seminal conferences at Quebec and Charlottetown, to the negotiations
with Métis leaders, to the solemn Treaties concluded with Aboriginal
nations under the auspices of the Royal Proclamation.
Most of these historical negotiations took place in an imperial
context, at a time when the British Crown still claimed authority over
Canada. Canada is now, of course, an independent state, even if its
independence was achieved by stealth — gradually and quietly — such
that scholars debate when it actually occurred. Nevertheless, the legal
effects of independence are profound.48 In Canadian fashion, we have
gradually been divesting ourselves of the last vestiges of our imperial
past. The British Crown is now the Crown of Canada, and the Governor
General has an important role in ensuring the integrity of the
Constitution and the pacts and Treaties that make it up.

46
See the insightful remarks of Binnie J. in Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] S.C.J. No. 33, [2001]
1 S.C.R. 911, at paras. 125-137 (S.C.C.), and the excellent discussion in Walters, “The Jurisprudence
of Reconciliation”, supra, note 12.
47
Supra, note 2, at para. 92 (emphasis added).
48
For discussion, see Brian Slattery, “The Independence of Canada” (1983) 5 S.C.L.R. 369.
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Just as the Constitution Acts — mostly enacted by the British
Parliament — are interpreted in a fashion that befits Canada’s
independence, so also another set of imperial instruments — the Royal
Proclamation and the historical Treaties — must be interpreted in a way
that takes account of the post-colonial character of Canada and the basic
status of First Peoples as partners in Confederation.49

V. THE DUTY OF DILIGENT PERFORMANCE
As seen earlier, Manitoba Metis holds that the principle of the
honour of the Crown is engaged by all constitutional obligations
undertaken by the Crown to Aboriginal peoples.50 Two basic duties arise
in this context. The Crown is required, first, to take a broad purposive
approach to the interpretation of the constitutional obligations. Second,
the Crown must act diligently to fulfil them.51 For convenience, we will
refer to these requirements globally as “the duty of diligent performance”
or simply “the constitutional duty”.
The first branch of the constitutional duty — that of broad purposive
interpretation — has long been recognized in the jurisprudence.52 More
novel is the second branch, which requires diligent fulfilment. The Court
cites a number of precedents in support of this branch,53 but the cases
cited deal mainly with matters of interpretation, and it seems clear that
the Court is breaking new ground here.
The Court remarks that the honour of the Crown imposes a heavy
obligation, so that not all interactions between the Crown and Aboriginal
peoples engage it. In the past, the constitutional duty has been found to
exist in two main instances. The first is Aboriginal Treaties, “where the
Crown’s honour is pledged to diligently carrying out its promises”.54 The
second is section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, where the Crown
must act honourably in defining the rights it guarantees.55

49

See Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation:
Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services, 1993).
50
Supra, note 2, at paras. 68-83, 91-94.
51
Id., at para. 75.
52
Id., at para. 76.
53
Id., at para. 73.
54
Id., at para. 79.
55
Id., at para. 69.
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Nevertheless, holds the Court, these are not the only cases in which
the constitutional duty exists. Reviewing the precedents — and in
particular those dealing with Treaties — the Court extracts a set of
general propositions. The duty of diligent performance arises when four
elements are present: (1) an intention to create obligations; (2) a certain
measure of solemnity; (3) an overarching purpose of reconciling
Aboriginal interests with the Crown’s sovereignty; and (4) a promise
explicitly owed to an Aboriginal group.56 In some instances, observes the
Court, the constitutional obligation may arise after a course of
consultation similar to treaty negotiations. Nevertheless, it seems clear
that the Court does not view this as a necessary element.
Where a Crown undertaking to Aboriginal peoples meets these four
criteria, the honour of the Crown is engaged, giving rise to the
constitutional duty of diligent performance. The Court goes on to apply
these criteria to section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and holds that it
satisfies all four.57
It is worth noting that the Royal Proclamation also meets these
conditions. As seen earlier, the Proclamation makes explicit undertakings
to Indian nations to shield their territories from unlawful settlement, with
the overall purpose of reconciling them to the Crown’s assertions of
sovereignty. As Binnie J. observes in Beckman:
The obligation of honourable dealing was recognized from the outset
by the Crown itself in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 ..., in which the
British Crown pledged its honour to the protection of Aboriginal
peoples from exploitation by non-Aboriginal peoples.58

The same conclusion holds true of Aboriginal Treaties, as Manitoba
Metis makes clear. The Court observes that the duty of diligent
performance “has arisen largely in the treaty context” and concludes that
the duty exists “whether the obligation arises in a treaty, as in the
precedents outlined above, or in the Constitution, as here”.59 Indeed, it
would be strange if Aboriginal Treaties did not meet the conditions set
out by the Court, which are drawn mainly from treaty case law.

56
57
58
59

Id., at paras. 71-72.
Id., at paras. 91-94.
Beckman, supra, note 12, at para. 42 (emphasis added).
Supra, note 2, at paras. 78-79. See also para. 92, quoted supra, at note 47.
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VI. THE DUTY TO NEGOTIATE
We saw that the Supreme Court emphasizes the role of negotiations
and consent in the formation of Canada. But it also recognizes that in
some instances the consent of Aboriginal peoples was lacking or tainted.
In such cases, the Crown is required to engage in good faith negotiations
with the peoples affected, in order to achieve a just settlement of their
claims.60 This duty has two aspects. First, the Crown has a positive legal
duty to do all that is reasonably possible to initiate the negotiating
process and to carry it through to a successful conclusion. Second, in the
process of negotiations, it has the obligation to conduct itself with honour
and integrity, avoiding even the appearance of sharp dealing.61
It could be argued that the Crown’s legal duties in this context are
confined to the second aspect. While there may be a moral or political
obligation on the part of the Crown to engage in negotiations, there cannot
be a legal obligation. It takes two parties to negotiate — and the
participation of both sides must be voluntary. How can the Crown be legally
bound to do something which it cannot bring about on its own? A second
problem relates to the enforcement of such an obligation. Unless judges are
willing to take on the role of actively supervising the Crown’s conduct, how
can they ensure that the Crown actually engages in substantive negotiations,
as opposed to merely showing up at the table? Thus, according to this
argument, the Crown’s legal duties are necessarily limited to the manner in
which it conducts itself once substantive negotiations get underway.
These are strong arguments, but they are not decisive. First, the
Supreme Court has gone out of its way to indicate that the Crown is
under a substantive legal duty to engage in negotiations and not merely
to conduct itself honourably in any negotiations that take place. Consider
the Court’s words in the Haida Nation case:
Where treaties remain to be concluded, the honour of the Crown requires
negotiations leading to a just settlement of Aboriginal claims. …
The potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these
rights be determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires
the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation.62
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Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 20.
Id., at para. 19; confirmed in Manitoba Metis, supra, note 2, at para. 73.
Haida Nation, id., at paras. 20 and 25 (emphasis added).
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As the Court reiterates in the recent Tsilhqot’in Nation decision,
governments are “under a legal duty to negotiate in good faith to resolve
claims to ancestral lands”.63
In effect, then, the Court holds that the Crown’s obligations spring
from its broader duty to determine, recognize and respect Aboriginal
rights. This duty is constitutional in nature and finds a place in section 35
of the Constitution Act, 1982. As Haida Nation explains:
Section 35 represents a promise of rights recognition, and “[i]t is
always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises” (Badger,
supra, at para. 41). This promise is realized and sovereignty claims
reconciled through the process of honourable negotiation. It is a
corollary of s. 35 that the Crown act honourably in defining the rights it
guarantees and in reconciling them with other rights and interests. 64

Thus, this constitutional promise is violated not only when the
Crown fails to negotiate honourably, but also (and more fundamentally)
when it refuses to negotiate at all or places unwarranted obstacles in the
path of negotiations.
Of course, as with the tango, it takes two to negotiate, and the Crown
cannot be held responsible for the actions of an unwilling partner.
Moreover, the distinction between the duty to negotiate and the duty to
negotiate honourably can be a fine one. But these factors do not relieve
the Crown of its duties in this area. The Crown is bound to take all
reasonable measures within its power to initiate and successfully pursue
negotiations, and to conduct itself honourably in the process.
The question arises how the duty to negotiate may be enforced. The
answer flows from the fact that the Crown has a constitutional duty under
section 35(1) to engage in honourable negotiations to determine
Aboriginal rights.65 If it fails to perform this duty diligently, a court may
issue declarations to this effect.66

Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44, at para. 18
(S.C.C.). See also para. 17: “The Court in Haida stated that the Crown had not only a moral duty,
but a legal duty to negotiate in good faith to resolve land claims (para. 25).”
64
Haida Nation, supra, note 1, at para. 20.
65
Id., at para. 20.
66
For an example of a court declaration enforcing the Crown obligation to negotiate
honourably, see Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development), [2013] F.C.J. No. 741, 2013 FC 669, at paras. 40-67 (F.C.T.D). However, the
decision is confined to the manner in which the negotiations are conducted.
63
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Aboriginal Constitution forms a vital part of the Constitution of
Canada — as significant in its own way as the federal pact between the
provinces, and the individual guarantees in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982
recognizes and affirms important elements of the Aboriginal Constitution,
but that section is not its source. The roots of the Aboriginal Constitution
lie in the ancient relations between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown
going back to the earliest days of European settlement — relations
recognized in the Royal Proclamation and given concrete form in
Treaties between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples.
In 1698, the Onondaga sachem, Sadeganaktie, stated in the course of
negotiations with the English at Albany:
… all of us sit under the shadow of that great Tree, which is full of
Leaves, and whose roots and branches extend not only to the Places and
Houses where we reside, but also to the utmost limits of our great
King’s dominion of this Continent of America, which Tree is now
become a Tree of Welfare and Peace, and our living under it for the
time to come will make us enjoy more ease, and live with greater
advantage than we have done for several years past.67

This Tree of Welfare and Peace is neither Indigenous nor British, but
a joint creation which encompasses both Indigenous and non-Indigenous
peoples and territories. As the sachem remarks, all of us sit in its shadow.

67
Quoted in Donald Grinde, Jr. & Bruce Johansen, Exemplar of Liberty: Native America
and the Evolution of Democracy (Los Angeles: University of California American Indian Studies
Center, 1991), at 11-12.

